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ABSTRACT
It is often claimed that international investment arbitration is marked by a revolving
door: individuals act sequentially and even simultaneously as arbitrator, legal counsel,
expert witness, or tribunal secretary. If this claim is correct, it has implications for our
understanding of which individuals possess power and influence within this commu-
nity; and ethical debates over conflicts of interests and transparency concerning ‘dou-
ble hatting’—when individuals simultaneously perform different roles across cases. In
this article, we offer the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the individuals that
make up the entire investment arbitration community. Drawing on our database of
1039 investment arbitration cases (including ICSID annulments) and the relationships
between the 3910 known individuals that form this community, we offer the first use
of social network analysis to describe the full investment arbitration community and ad-
dress key sociological and normative questions in the literature. Our results partly
contradict recent empirical scholarship as we identify a different configuration of cen-
tral ‘power brokers’. Moreover, the normative concerns with double hatting are partly
substantiated. A select but significant group of individuals score highly and continually
on our double hatting index.
I . INTRODUCTION
It is regularly but anecdotally observed that international investment arbitration is
marked by a ‘revolving door.’ Single individual actors play multiple roles as arbitra-
tors, counsel, expert witnesses, and tribunal secretaries within this fragmented and ad
hoc adjudicative system of investment arbitration. The movement between roles
may be sequential1 or even simultaneous. The latter practice is often referred to as
‘double hatting’ and has attracted significant criticism on the grounds of conflict of
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo and Co-Director, Centre on Law and Social Transformation,
University of Bergen and CMI. Email: malcolm.langford@jus.uio.no.
** Postdoctoral Researcher, PluriCourts Centre of Excellence, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo. Email:
d.f.behn@jus.uio.no.
*** Research Assistant, PluriCourts Centre of Excellence, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo. Email:
r.h.lie@student.jus.uio.no.
1 For example, an arbitrator may act as legal counsel in a case, then as an arbitrator in another case, an expert
witness in a third, and then back to legal counsel work in a fourth case.
VC The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
 301
Journal of International Economic Law, 2017, 20, 301–331
doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgx018
Advance Access Publication Date: 31 May 2017
Article
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article-abstract/20/2/301/3859188 by U
niversity of Liverpool user on 15 February 2019
interests.2 However, the nature and extent of the revolving door in international in-
vestment arbitration has never been empirical determined and its sociological and
normative implications remain largely unexplored.
This article presents the first ever analysis of the entire international investment
arbitration community since its inception. It draws on our PITAD3 database of 1039
international investment arbitration cases and ICSID4 annulment proceedings in
order to first map the identity and relationships of 3910 individuals in their different
roles, using social network analysis and various indexes. In addition, we examine
sociologically whether the revolving door phenomenon challenges our understanding
of who has power within the international investment arbitration community; and
we empirically assess normative concerns over double hatting by determining the ex-
tent to which it occurs and whether the practice has eased or worsened over time.
In doing so, we seek to advance the existing literature on international investment
arbitration in three discrete ways. Our first contribution is descriptive. By focusing on
a broad group of actors, we partly return to Dezalay and Garth’s vision of the ‘field’
as the analytical unit. The focus is less on specific institutional roles (particularly
those of the arbitrator), but instead the ‘networks and relationships organized’
around arbitration and the ‘space for positions and struggles’.5 To be sure, Dezalay
and Garth were significantly concerned with arbitrators. After extensive empirical
work they observed that a coterie of ‘grand old men’ dominated the field of interna-
tional commercial arbitration.6 Small in number, linked closely, and mostly
European, they even referred to themselves as a ‘club’ or a ‘mafia’.7 After a period of
‘generational warfare’, these figures were joined and complemented by Anglo-
American arbitration technocrats and law firms.8 Since then scholars have continued
to map the field with a focus on gender, nationality, education and employment
background.9 Recent medium-N surveys confirm elite educational backgrounds and
male and Western identities of arbitrators,10 but also the possible rise of a third and
2 See Phillipe Sands, ‘Conflict and Conflicts in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Ethical Standards for
Counsel’, in Arthur Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The
Fordham Papers (New York: Brill, 2012), at 28–49; Phillipe Sands, ‘Developments in Geopolitics – The
End(s) of Judicialization?’ 2015 ESIL Conference Closing Speech, 12 September 2015.
3 PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD) as of 1 January 2017.
4 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
5 Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercia Arbitrtion and the Construction
of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), at 20.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, at 10.
8 Ibid.
9 See e.g., Susan Franck, ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 86 North
Carolina Law Review 1 (2007); Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu, ‘Are Arbitrators Political?’ Working
Paper (December 2011); Paul Friedland and Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘2012 International Arbitration Survey:
Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process’ 8 Constitutional Law International 39 (2013);
Sergio Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’, 25 European Journal of International Law 387
(2014). Susan Franck et al., ‘International Arbitration: Demographics, Precision and Justice’ ICCA
Congress Series No. 18: Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges 33 (2015); Thomas Schultz and Robert
Kovacs, ‘The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years after Dezalay and Garth’, 28(2)
Arbitration International 161 (2012).
10 Franck et al., ibid.
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more pluralistic generation of managerial arbitrators within commercial, but not in-
vestment treaty, arbitration.11
However, Dezalay and Garth’s work also showed the peculiar symbolic (and
legal) capital of those actors that crossed institutional lines. They devoted significant
space to the role of legal counsel, law firms, and witnesses and noted implicitly the
potential role and power of a revolving door. One vignette is telling: an Anglo-
American litigator, with his first case in international commercial arbitration, learnt
the importance of appointing distinguished arbitrators as counsel. With the ‘combin-
ation of Lalive and Goldman’ he commented, ‘I was a conductor of virtuosos and
prima donnas.’12 Thus, we map the roles of all types of actors in investment arbitra-
tion and provide the first quantitative perspective of the field and empirical estima-
tion of the revolving door. In doing so, we also identify key attributes of all actors
such as gender and nationality.13
Our second contribution is to build on sociological work that seeks to identify who
has the power in the investment arbitration community and the extent of that power.
In Dezalay and Garth’s account, power was measured in largely qualitative terms—
an actor’s symbolic capital. This power was determined by the combination of ‘social
class, education, career and expertise’, which aspiring arbitrators needed to optimally
combine in order to project neutrality, competence, and authority.14 Puig, however,
provides an essentially quantitative perspective of power in his recent social network
analysis of investment arbitrators. By counting the number of roles and different
types of ties between arbitrators, power is measured by an individual’s exposure in
the system.15 Tracking all arbitral appointments at ICSID between 1972 and 2014
he identifies a core of approximately 25 arbitrators whom he calls ‘power brokers’.16
Notably, with the exception of a few ‘formidable women’, Puig found that grand old
men from Europe and North America continue to ‘dominate the arbitration profes-
sion’.17 He argues that the maintenance of a core over a long period may support
Ginsburg’s theory that the imbalance in appointments is a result of strategic action:
that the rapid global spread of arbitration incentivizes insider arbitrators to raise the
barriers to keep out new entrants.
Using social network analysis, our study builds on Puig in order to better under-
stand the biographic dynamics of this core group. However, it differs in three import-
ant ways. First, we analyze a much larger dataset, which includes non-ICSID cases—
roughly doubling the sample size. Second, we expand the actors to include all known
legal counsel, expert witnesses, and tribunal secretaries.18 In our view, Puig
11 Schultz and Kovacs, above n 9.
12 Ibid, at 109.
13 In a companion article, we have analyzed the gender roles and causes of gender segregation in interna-
tional investment arbitration: see Taylor St. John, et al., ‘Glass Ceilings and Arbitral Dealings: Explaining
the Gender Gap in Investment Arbitration’, Gender on the International Bench, PluriCourts-iCourts
Workshop, Oslo, 23–24 March 2017.
14 Dezalay and Garth, above n 5, at 20.
15 Puig, above n 9.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, at 387. Recent medium-N surveys find similar patterns.
18 The data collected in PITAD is limited by instances where awards and documents listing arbitrators, legal
counsel, expert witnesses, and tribunal secretaries are not publicly available. Furthermore, as ICSID
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undercounts the importance of legal counsel and expert witnesses in the system. Not
only are legal counsel tasked with directing much of the cases, they are also deeply
involved in arbitrator appointments—they are the key gatekeepers in the system.
This methodological innovation also means we are able to reflect anew on existing
explanatory theories of monopolistic behavior in the arbitration market. We can
highlight and quantify the role of legal counsel in strategic and (often undervalued)
structural explanations.19
Third, we weight the different roles of arbitrators. As far as we have determined,
Puig has equally weighted presiding arbitrators and claimant/respondent-appointed
wing arbitrators. Yet, the president of an arbitration represents the most prestigious
role in arbitration, possesses the most responsibility in case management, and exer-
cises the most influence in the final decision as they are usually not appointed solely
by one party. In light of this, we weight arbitrators differently and thus introduce a
more qualitative measurement of power – recognizing that the symbolic capital of a
presiding arbitrator is higher than a wing arbitrator. In doing so, we avoid an anom-
aly produced by Puig’s method, in which some wing arbitrators have a rank that does
not intuitively cohere with their actual power in the system.
Our final contribution is to ground normative debates on double hatting in an em-
pirical reality. Various scholars have raised concerns with conflicts of interests about
arbitrators simultaneously acting as legal counsel and arbitrator in different cases.20
However, the extent of double hatting has never been measured. It remains the sub-
ject of anecdote and casual observation. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to hear
claims that the practice is decreasing over time with the implication that the ethical
concerns are less sharp today – but no evidence is offered for such assertions.
Determining the nature and extent of double hatting is particularly important in
the current political climate. Concern with this practice has strengthened the many
contemporary critiques of the investment arbitration system; and will become even
more relevant as investment arbitration continues on a growth trajectory (in terms of
the annual number of cases filed). Many of these critiques focus on the arbitral system.
provides the most complete and comprehensive publicly available registry on arbitral appointments, legal
counsel, and tribunal secretaries, that data on ICSID arbitrations will be more complete than that of all
non-ICSID arbitration. In this respect, the study illustrates the benefits of datasets as they grow in size:
see discussion by Wolfgang Alschner, Joost Pauwelyn, and Sergio Puig, ‘The Data-Driven Future of
International Economic Law’, [THIS VOLUME].
19 See discussion of the results on power brokers in Section IV.
20 See Sands, ‘Conflict and Conflicts’, above n 2; Sands, ‘Geopolitics’, above n 2; Judith Levine, ‘Dealing
with Arbitrator “Issue Conflicts” in International Arbitration’, 61 Dispute Resolution Journal 60 (2006);
Ruth Mackenzie and Phillipe Sands, ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the
International Judge’, 44 Harvard International Law Journal 271 (2003); Joseph Brubaker, ‘The Judge
Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International Adjudication’, 26(1) Berkeley Journal of
International Law 111 (2008). Double hatting as an expert witness while at the same time acting as arbi-
trator or legal counsel in another case may also be problematic, but that requires a more nuanced ethical
discussion.
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It has been slated for its ‘pale, male and stale’ character (that arbitrators are over-
whelming older white men),21 lack of transparency in the selection of arbitrators,22
third party-funders,23 law firm-driven litigation,24 excessive collegiality,25 and high lev-
els of fees and costs.26 These critiques all share with double hatting a similar concern:
the closed nature of the community and its ability to engage in self-dealing.
Moreover, these critiques have all contributed to the so-called legitimacy crisis in
investment arbitration. With over 831 known investment treaty arbitrations initiated
to date (almost all coming in the past 15 years),27 and a significant number of in-
stances in which the threat of treaty arbitration has been used, states hosting foreign
investors are increasingly finding themselves having to defend their laws and policies
before and in the shadow of international arbitral tribunals. In addition to the process
of legitimacy concerns above, States and other stakeholder have raising concerns
over outcomes. Arbitration awards have been perceived as excessively pro-investor,28
pro-investment,29 and anti-developing state.30 Thus, a failure to clarify or address a
process legitimacy concerns such as double hatting only compounds the sense of
crisis.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section II we describe the international invest-
ment arbitration regime and present our dataset. In Section III we set out data separ-
ately for each of the four types of roles and analyze their relative importance through
social network analysis and/or case ranks. In Section IV, we bring the roles together
21 See e.g., Lucy Greenwood and C. Mark Baker, ‘Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration
Tribunals’, 28 Arbitration International 653 (2012); Susan Franck et al., ‘The Diversity Challenge:
Exploring the “Invisible College” of International Arbitration’, 53 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
429 (2015); Gus Van Harten, ‘The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration’,
Columbia FDI Perspectives No. 59 (6 February 2012).
22 See e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, ‘Who Decides Who in International Investment Arbitration’, 35(2) University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 431 (2014); Sergio Puig, ‘Blinding International Justice’,
56(3) Virginia Journal of International Law (2017), forthcoming.
23 Catherine Rogers, ‘Gamblers, Loan Sharks and Third-Party Funders’, in Catherine Rogers (ed.), Ethics in
International Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
24 See e.g., Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia Olivet, ‘Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators, and
Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom’, Corporate Europe Observatory (November
2012).
25 Puig, above n 9, at 400.
26 Focusing at least on transparency of costs awards, see Susan Franck, ‘Rationalizing Costs in Investment
Treaty Arbitration’, 88 Washington University Law Review 769 (2011).
27 PITAD, above n 3.
28 For instance, tribunals exhibit a bias that disproportionately favors the interests and rights of individual
foreign investors when pitted against the duty of a state to regulate and legislate in the broader public
interest. See e.g., Gus Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical
Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 211 (2012), at 251.
29 For instance, tribunals exhibit a bias that disproportionately favors liberal economic rights and values over
other equally important public welfare objectives such as public health, environmental protection, or fun-
damental human rights. See e.g., Jorge Vi~nuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
30 For instance, tribunals are disproportionately more likely to rule against less developed respondent states.
See e.g., Thomas Schultz and Cedric Dupont, ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or
Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study’, 25 European Journal of International Law
1147 (2014); Daniel Behn, Tarald Berge and Malcolm Langford, ‘Poor States or Poor Governance:
Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, PluriCourts Research Paper No. 16-04 (2016),
available at: http://ssrn.com/ abstract¼2740516 (visited 15 March 2017).
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to analyze the entire field and examine who are the power brokers in the community.
In Section V, we analyze the extent to which double hatting is occurring and whether
there is real cause for normative concern.
I I . THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REGIME
The modern international investment regime can be described in multiple ways, but
generally includes the international institutions and rules governing the regulation of
trans-border investments. Built on a network of more than 3,500 signed bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs), regional free trade agreements (FTAs),31 and a handful of
plurilateral investment treaties,32 the regime gives a foreign investor a number of sub-
stantive protections and rights,33 including most importantly, investor–state dispute
settlement (ISDS) provisions. While this regime has its roots in the immediate post-
World War II period, it was not until the 1990s that the annual number of interna-
tional investment agreements (IIAs) exploded.
For the purposes of this article, we are focused on the institution of, and networks
arising out of, international arbitration between a foreign investor and the state host-
ing their investments: this prominently includes ITA, but can also include cases aris-
ing out of contracts or concessions and/or a host state’s foreign investment laws. An
ITA case commonly arises when a foreign investor alleges that the beneficiary rights
they are granted under an IIA has been breached by the state hosting its investments.
Investment arbitration can also occur in cases between foreign investors and host
states under arbitration agreements allowing for investor–state arbitration (as
embedded in various forms of investment contracts or concessions) or national for-
eign direct investment (FDI) laws. These particular forms of arbitration are often ad-
ministered under ICSID. But they can also arise under ad hoc procedures or the
rules of international commercial arbitration centers.
We have tracked and coded all these cases in our new and first-of-its-kind data-
base (PITAD). It includes all known treaty-based arbitrations, all ICSID contract
and FDI law-based arbitrations and all ICISD annulment committee proceedings;
and each case is coded for up to 138 different variables. The dataset would ideally in-
clude all international commercial arbitrations and all non-ICSID contract-based in-
vestment arbitrations, but given the default confidentiality of such processes, the data
31 UNCTAD provides an extensive database on IIAs, available at: http://investmentpolicy hub.unctad.org/
IIA (visited 15 March 2017).
32 See e.g., Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Central American-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), as well as, recently concluded or late-round negotiated trea-
ties: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), Singapore-EU Free Trade Agreement, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
Agreement, and the Pan-Asian Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (RCEP).
33 IIAs typically include: prohibitions against expropriation without adequate compensation, full protection
and security, fair and equitable treatment (FET), most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, and national
treatment.
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available remains far from complete or accessible.34 In any case, our dataset has a cer-
tain coherence. It covers all known cases whose legal claim is procedurally or sub-
stantively based on an international treaty: whether through the ICSID Convention
and/or various IIAs. This consequent ‘public law’ nature of the arbitration arguably
heightens concerns around transparency and conflicts of interests raised by the
revolving door phenomenon.35
However, the number of international investment arbitrations arising out of con-
tracts or FDI laws pales in comparison with the exponential increase in investment
treaty-based arbitrations over the past two decades (see Figure 1). In fact, the most
distinct feature of this treaty-based regime is the explosion of litigation. It is this me-
teoric rise in the instances of ITA over the past two decades that has led some to
claim there is ‘no other category of private individuals’ that are ‘given such expansive
rights in international law as are private actors investing across borders’.36
Figure 1. International investment arbitration cases registered by year (1987–2016).
PITAD, PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD) as of 1 January 2017;
831 cases in total through 1 January 2017.
34 Indeed, there is a significant overlap between individuals within the international commercial arbitration
community and the international investment arbitration community. See discussion of data limitations in
Alschner, Pauwelyn and Puig, above n 18.
35 Stephan Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’, 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 57 (2012). We
have discovered though that our field-based approach to international investment arbitration picks up a
number of key actors in international commercial arbitration. Quite a number that play roles as legal
counsel, arbitrators, and secretaries in international investment arbitration are also regularly involved in
international commercial arbitrations.
36 Beth Simmons, ‘Bargaining over BITS, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of
International Investment’, 66 World Politics 12 (2014), at 42.
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Prior to the year 2000, there were only a small number of ITA cases registered.37
These cases raised seemingly few concerns and went largely unnoticed by the inter-
national legal community. This changed at the beginning of the millennium as the
annual number of ITA cases surged, with an average of 40 cases per year in the
2000s, and 50 cases per year in the 2010s. Of the 831 treaty-based cases registered to
date, 111 different states have acted as respondents, compared with claimants from
67 different home states;38 and by the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the use of
ITA had become a global, prominent and lucrative area of international adjudication,
while at the same time coming under increasing scrutiny from a growing number of
states, scholars, and civil society actors.
By comparison, the number of ICSID-based contract or FDI law arbitrations have
totaled 118 to date with an average of about five cases registered per year since the
first case in 1972.39 While the initiation of non-treaty based ICSID cases still occurs,
these cases only comprise less than 10% of the ICSID caseload today. In addition,
there have been 90 ICSID annulment committee cases registered over the past two
decades (see also Figure 1). Under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, a party
may seek an annulment of their award on one of five narrow grounds: the arbitral tri-
bunal was not properly constituted, it exceeded its powers, it failed to give reasons, it
was tainted by corruption, or there had been a serious departure from a rule or pro-
cedure. While these annulments concern existing litigation, they are staffed with a
new arbitration panels and are thus included as separate cases.
Not all of the cases have been concluded and claimant-investor success rates vary.
Of the 949 international investment arbitration cases that have been registered
(treaty-based, ICSID contract-based, or FDI law-based) as of 1 January 2017, the
outcomes are as follows:40 419 have been concluded,41 301 remain pending, and an
additional 229 were settled or discontinued. Of the concluded cases, claimant-
investors have won on the merits in 47% of cases and lost on jurisdiction or the mer-
its in 53%. The remaining ‘cases’ are the annulment. Of these, 41 have been con-
cluded, 14 remain pending and an additional 25 have either been settled or
discontinued. Of the concluded annulments, 32% resulted in a full or partial annul-
ment of the underlying case and 68% in rejection of the annulment request. 42
I I I . MAPPING THE ACTORS
In this section, we identify and map the individuals in each actor role in international
investment arbitration: arbitrators, legal counsel, expert witness, and tribunal secre-
tary. This mapping is partly done by a simple count of number of cases and an iden-
tification of attributes such as nationality, gender, legal role, and/or institutional role.
37 The first treaty-based arbitration to be registered was in 1987: Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (27 June 1990).
38 PITAD, above n 3.
39 The first ICSID arbitration to be registered: Holiday Inns S.A. and others v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID
Case No. ARB/72/1, Settled.
40 PITAD, above n 3.
41 A concluded case is one where the claimant-investor has either won on the merits or lost on jurisdiction
or the merits. It does not include discontinued or settled cases.
42 Thus, all combined, 1039 investment arbitrations are analyzed.
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In addition, we provide a separate social network analysis for arbitrators. A full social
network analysis of the entire community is undertaken in the next section.
Social network analysis constitutes both a theory and a method.43 Theoretically,
social network emphasizes the importance that ties between individuals may have for
their behavior and and transmission of ‘resources.’ This pattern of relations may also
provide either opportunities for, or constraints on, individual action, which is espe-
cially relevant in the case of a market such as international investment arbitration.
Methodologically, social network analysis provides tools and measurements for visu-
alizing and understanding the relationships between individuals and similar individ-
uals. The core of such methods are nodes (in our case individual actors) and edges
(relationships between individual actors participating in the same arbitral dispute).
Social network methods also provide the opportunities to measure different aspects
of network centrality. In this respect, social network analysis theory is an ideal
method to analyze the arbitration community: almost all observers note the import-
ant role of networks in securing appointments.
To be sure, network analysis is not only relevant to social relations between legal
actors. As two other contributions in this volume demonstrate, it can also be used to
understand and explain legal citation patterns. However, the underlying theoretical
perspectives and methodological approaches remain the same for both types of net-
work analysis and all three papers foreground centrality.44
A. Arbitrators
In international investment arbitration, each party to the dispute will customarily ap-
point one of three arbitrators; and in many cases the parties (or the co-arbitrators)
will jointly appoint the presiding arbitrator. However, there is a large degree of vari-
ation in the manner of appointment. While the default is that the parties will appoint
the two wing arbitrators, the presiding arbitrator can be appointed by the parties, the
two wing arbitrators or by the institution hosting the arbitration. For ICSID annul-
ment committee cases, all three annulment committee members are appointed by
the Secretary-General of ICSID.
Of all the possible configurations for the appointment of arbitrators in interna-
tional investment arbitration cases, however, there is an underlying constant: all arbi-
trators are selected for a particular dispute on an ad hoc basis. This structure means
that for every arbitration, there are individuals (either the parties, legal counsel repre-
senting the parties, arbitral institutions or co-arbitrators) that are making selection
decisions for each of the 1039 cases in our dataset.
The top 25 arbitrators by numbers of appointments are listed in Table 1 There is
a familiar pattern of well-known grand old men and two ‘formidable women’ (Stern
and Kaufmann-Kohler), as Puig christened them. With the exception of four arbitra-
tors, all those listed are nationals of Western states. Yet, even these four are not
43 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and. Applications (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1994); Brian Carolan, Social Network Analysis and Education: Theory,
Methods and Applications (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2014), 3–22.
44 The place of investment awards and WTO decisions in international law: a citation analysis’,[THIS
VOLUME], at p. XX; Mattias DerlO˜n & Johan Lindholm, ’Is it Good Law? Network Analysis and the
CJEU’s Internal Market Jurisprudence’, [THIS VOLUME], at p. XX
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particularly representative of the rest of the world. The single arbitrator from Eastern
Europe, Alexandrov, has been a resident in the USA for almost three decades—with
education and employment experience from US institutions.45 The other three are
from high income Latin American states, and either live or have their professional
practice based in the US or Western Europe. Most of these top 25 arbitrators also
have a sizeable number of influential and prestigious presiding chair appointments.
Only three are consistently appointed by the claimant (Brower, Alexandrov, and
Naon) and three consistently appointed by the respondent (Stern, Thomas, and
Sands). The number of total appointments of this group is also formidable. The top
25 arbitrators account for 4% of all investment arbitrators (629 in total) but are rep-
resented in just over a third of all arbitral appointments (991 of 2676) in our dataset.
We now conduct a social network analysis of this community or investment arbi-
trators. In Figure 2, we provide a visual representation of this network. This diagram
Table 1. International investment arbitrators—top 25 by appointments
Rank Arbitrator Nationality Presiding Claimant-
appointed
Respondent-
appointed
Annulment
committee
Total
cases
1 Brigitte Stern France 4 1 82 1 88
2 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler Switzerland 38 15 2 1 56
3 L. Yves Fortier Canada 24 25 2 2 53
4 Charles Brower US 1 50 0 1 52
5 Francisco Orrego Vicu~na Chile 18 27 3 1 49
6 Albert Jan van den Berg Netherlands 15 16 12 1 44
7 J. Christopher Thomas Canada 0 1 42 0 43
8 Bernard Hanotiau Belgium 12 18 5 5 40
8 Karl-Heinz Bo¨ckstiegel Germany 26 8 2 4 40
9 V.V. Veeder UK 25 6 6 0 37
9 Bernardo Cremades Spain 14 10 10 3 37
10 Piero Bernardini Italy 11 13 3 9 36
11 Marc Lalonde Canada 8 20 7 0 35
12 Rodrigo Oreamuno Costa Rica 15 0 14 5 34
13 Stanimir Alexandrov Bulgaria 3 25 1 3 32
14 Phillipe Sands UK 1 4 25 0 30
15 Juan Fernandez-Armesto Spain 21 1 3 4 29
16 Jan Paulsson France 13 12 2 1 28
16 Horacio Grigera Naon Argentina 2 24 2 0 28
16 David Williams New Zealand 10 17 0 1 28
17 James Crawford Australia 12 2 10 3 27
18 Pierre Tercier Switzerland 22 0 3 0 25
19 Toby Landau UK 3 1 20 0 24
19 Vaughan Lowe UK 13 2 9 0 24
19 Franklin Berman UK 10 5 4 5 24
45 On the importance of converging institutional practices, see Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, ‘The Iron
Cage Revisited: Collective Rationality and Institutional Isomorphism in Organizational Fields’, 48(2)
American Sociological Review 147 (1983).
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charts the centrality of the arbitrators according to the number, place, and weight of
their edges. As foreshadowed, we have weighted arbitrators slightly differently from
Puig. The relationships are weighed according to a relationship matrix where a dis-
count is given depending on the perceived importance of the role in relation to the
other nodes, role, and allegiance.
For arbitrators, this weighting is directed so that a single working relationship be-
tween two arbitrators will have two unique scores. In the case of a presiding arbitra-
tor and a wing arbitrator, the president’s relationship will be given a score of 1 while
the wing arbitrators’ relationship will be given a score of 0.75, reflecting the perceived
discrepancy of power between the roles. These weighted and directed relationships
form the basis for the two subsequent scores—Page Rank and HITS Hub.46 While
describing these scoring systems in detail is beyond the scope of this article, both are
cumulative ranking systems that use every possible path in the graph to determine
Figure 2. Mapping the international investment arbitrator network.
46 Pooja Devil, Ashlesha Gupta and Ashutosh Dixit, ‘Comparative Study of HITS and PageRank Link based
Ranking Algorithms’, 3(2) International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Communication
Engineering 5749 (2014). We note that Derle´n and Lindholm, above n 44 and in this volume, also favour
PageRank and Hub scores.
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the relative importance of the node. The HITS Hub score expands on page rank
including a measure of consensus between the nodes and ranks it according to the
total accumulative value of the relationships that the node owns. The figure maps
the community according to the HITS Hub score. This is because it measures the
importance of the relationships, and hence the power that any given arbitrator can
likely assert.
Eyeballing the map suggests an inner core of influential arbitrators followed by a
second ring of arbitrators. We therefore test the presence of a strong core-periphery
by presenting an alternative visualization in Figure 3. As with Figure 2, names are
scaled according to their HITS Hub score. Each arbitrator is ranked counter-
clockwise according to the same ranking. The inner circle compromises of the top
25 arbitrators found in Table 2. The diagram illustrates the substantial weight of rela-
tionships between the top 25 arbitrators as well as their consistent dominance of
roles in comparison to the rest of the network.
A closer inspection of the figures shows why some international investment arbitra-
tors feature prominently in the network analysis. In Table 2, we rank the top 25 arbi-
trators according to their spatial influence in the network. The table presents four
factors for evaluating an arbitrator’s importance; degrees—weighted and unweighted,
Page Rank, and HITS Hub score. The table is ranked by the HITS Hub score.
Figure 3. Mapping the international investment arbitrator network.
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Examining the results, the order changes in comparison to the number of appoint-
ments (compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 2). Some regularly-appointed arbitrators drop
out of the top 25 appointment list completely (see Table 1) while others such as Stern,
Brower, Thomas, Paulsson, and Cremades drop down on the rankings. The reason is
clear on closer inspection. Arbitrators which predominantly represent one party in arbitra-
tion (i.e., they are primarily appointed by either the claimant or respondent) drop down
the ranking. Notably, this is only partly a function of the different weightings. It also
occurs because wing arbitrators tend to be further out in the network compared to those
who have a more even representation in terms of appointments (i.e., those that are ap-
pointed as either presiding arbitrator, claimant-appointed arbitrator, or respondent-
appointed arbitrator). Thus, the pattern of their connections and subsequent connections
revealed that predominantly party-appointed arbitrators were not as close to the core.
For the sake of comparison, we also provide the arbitrator’s rankings from Puig’s
analysis (based on the degrees score).47 This shows the difference gained in adding
Table 2. Arbitrator network rankings—centrality and influence (top 25)
Rank Rank
(Table 1)
Rank
(Puig)
Arbitrator Nationality HITS
hub
Page
rank
Degrees out
(Weighted)
1 2 5 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler Switzerland 1.00000 0.01300 123 (110)
2 1 1 Brigitte Stern France 0.90342 0.02097 185 (125)
3 9 11 V.V. Veeder UK 0.71088 0.00994 85 (76)
4 3 8 L. Yves Fortier Canada 0.63079 0.01531 128 (108)
5 4 6 Charles Brower USA 0.61830 0.01229 114 (78)
6 NI* 2 Francisco Orrego Vicu~na Chile 0.57162 0.01281 104 (83)
7 6 9 Albert Jan van den Berg Netherlands 0.51763 0.01225 97 (76)
8 8 13 Bernard Hanotiau Belgium 0.48508 0.01025 85 (68)
9 8 16 Karl-Heinz Bo¨ckstiegel Germany 0.44687 0.01135 84 (75)
10 19 22 Vaughan Lowe UK 0.43337 0.00750 57 (49)
11 16 15 David Williams New Zealand 0.43253 0.00695 61 (47)
12 11 4 Marc Lalonde Canada 0.42718 0.01011 77 (57)
13 7 17 J. Christopher Thomas Canada 0.40380 0.01153 96 (65)
14 10 10 Piero Bernardini Italy 0.39353 0.01027 76 (62)
15 15 18 Juan Fernandez-Armesto Spain 0.36776 0.00827 63 (60)
16 18 7 Pierre Tercier Switzerland 0.34175 0.00725 55 (53)
17 NI NI** Daniel Price USA 0.33412 0.00307 46 (33)
18 NI NI William Park USA 0.32939 0.00618 47 (39)
19 19 NI Franklin Berman UK 0.31241 0.00605 49 (42)
20 9 3 Bernardo Cremades Spain 0.30521 0.00982 76 (62)
21 12 14 Rodrigo Oreamuno Costa Rica 0.30327 0.00994 74 (63)
22 NI NI Andre´s Rigo Sureda Spain 0.29313 0.00681 51 (50)
23 13 25 Stanimir Alexandrov Bulgaria 0.28874 0.00826 69 (50)
24 NI NI Emmanuel Gaillard France 0.28640 0.00681 56 (42)
25 16 12 Jan Paulsson France 0.28262 0.00708 57 (47)
*NI: Not included in the list of top 25 arbitrators by number of appointments (Table 1 above)
**NI: Not included in the list of top 25 arbitrators in Puig’s analysis.
Sergio Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’, 25 European Journal of International Law 387 (2014), at 415.
47 Puig, above n 9, at 415.
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non-ICSID cases and in weighing presiding and wing arbitrators differently. While
our general rankings are not totally dissimilar from Puig’s unweighted network ana-
lysis of ICSID cases,48 we have uncovered some new and important arbitrators in the
top 25, including Price, Park, Riga Sureda, and Gaillard. These arbitrators frequently
are chosen to arbitrate in non-ICSID cases. Another interesting distinction is that
some arbitrators that rank highly on Puig’s scoring, drop down the rankings consid-
erably in our index (compare columns 1 with 3 in Table 2). For example, Cremades,
Paulsson, and Tercier are significantly lower in Puig’s ranking when compared with
ours (largely a function of taking few arbitral appointments in the past two to three
years). Contrariwise, Lowe and Veeder jump up nearly a dozen places. These shifts
are attributable to differentiated scoring (Lowe and Veeder primarily act as presiding
arbitrators) but it is also a function of the increased number of appointments that
these arbitrators have received in the past two to three years.49
B. Legal counsel
We now turn to the role of legal counsel in the international investment arbitration
network. They represent a paradox. On one hand, they are numerous. We have iden-
tified 2699 distinct lawyers that have represented claimants and respondents: see
Figure 4. On the other hand, there is a core of lawyers who dominate the caseload.
Only 14% (382 lawyers) have litigated more than two cases, while only 1% (the top
25) have litigated more than 13 cases: see Table 3. A member of this top 1% of
Figure 4. Mapping the full network.
48 Ibid.
49 Indeed, one challenge of network analysis is that it is often cross-sectional and poorly integrates change
over time. See discussion in Charlotin, above n 44.
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Table 3. Legal counsel—cases, nationality, and law firm (Top 25)
Rank Counsel Nationality Law firm(s) For
claimant
For
resp.
Total
cases*
1 Stanimir
Alexandrov
Bulgaria Sidley Austin j
Powell Goldstein
13 18 31
2 Nigel Blackaby UK Freshfields 26 4 30
3 Osvaldo
Guglielmino
Argentina Argentina Ministry 0 25 25
4 Emmanuel
Gaillard
France Shearman & Sterling 14 7 21
5 Todd Weiler Canada Todd Weiler 20 0 20
6 Angelina Abbona Argentina Argentina Ministry 0 19 19
6 Ronald Goodman US Foley Hoag j
White & Case
3 16 19
7 Stephen Jagusch New Zealand Quinn Emanuel j
Allen & Overy
12 6 18
7 Gabriela
Alvarez-Avila
Mexico Curtis Mallet 0 18 18
7 Jan Paulsson France Freshfields j Three
Crowns j Coudert
7 11 18
7 Hamid Gharavi France Derains & Gharavi 11 7 18
8 Stephen Anway US Squire Patton Boggs j
Squire Sanders
1 16 17
9 Rostislav Pekar Czech Squire Patton Boggs j
Squire Sanders
2 14 16
9 George Kahale US Curtis Mallet 0 16 16
9 R. Doak Bishop US King & Spalding 16 0 16
9 Paolo Di Rosa US Arnold & Porter j
Winston & Strawn
3 13 16
9 Robert Volterra Canada Latham & Watkins j
Volterra Fietta
9 7 16
9 Jean Kalicki US Arnold & Porter 5 11 16
10 Mark Clodfelter US US Ministry j
Foley Hoag
1 14 15
10 Marinn Carlson US Sidley Austin 5 10 15
11 Barry Appleton Canada Appleton & Associates 14 0 14
11 Judith Gill UK Allen & Overy 10 4 14
11 James Crawford Australia Matrix Chambers 8 6 14
11 Craig Miles US King & Spalding 14 0 14
12 Daniel Price US Sidley Austin j Powell
Goldstein
8 5 13
*ICSID Annulments counted additionally
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litigators has thus appeared on average in every second case in international invest-
ment arbitration (530 of 1039).
Examining this group more closely, Western nationals and law firms clearly domin-
ate. Moreover, almost without exception, the non-Western contingent only represent
their home state as in-house counsel (i.e., Argentina)50 or only act as respondent state
counsel within their home states’ region (i.e., Mexico and Czech Republic).51 Tellingly,
the only two non-Western legal counsel that have represented claimant-investors in
international investment arbitration cases are long-term residents of the US
(Alexandrov) and France (Gharavi), with elite education from these states. Moreover, a
number of top arbitrators also feature on this legal counsel list;52 and we will return to
this important revolving door phenomenon in the next section. The one (slightly) posi-
tive sign of diversity in this group concerns women. Compared to the arbitrator cluster,
they are better represented with five of the top 25 being women (20%).53 The final fea-
ture worth noting is the role of the law firms of legal counsel. Anglo-American and
French laws firms dwarf the list—even for counsel that represent predominantly re-
spondent states. Only four of the top 28 have spent some time as government-
employed counsel and only one exclusively so—the last legal counsel on the list.54
C. Expert witnesses
Expert witnesses have not been a focus in previous studies of the international invest-
ment arbitration community.55 However, in constructing the PITAD database, we
were continually surprised by the regular appearance of familiar names amongst the
expert witnesses. Moreover, some of this expert advice addressed rather pedestrian
points in international investment law. On its face, it was not why such caliber of ex-
pert testimony was required. Our suspicion was that parties were also using leading
figures (often other arbitrators) as part of a symbolic strategy, something that
Dezalay and Garth also found in their interviews. To be sure, expert witnesses pos-
sess more than symbolic power, particularly if they are the only expert witness on a
particular point or they are providing valuations for the damages/quantum phase of
the arbitration. The material and legal power of these expert witnesses in the system
should not be undervalued.
Table 4 ranks the top 25 expert witnesses according to their number of appear-
ances in international investment arbitration cases. It is notable that only five expert
witnesses have appeared more than five times and together account for 82 cases
(11% of all known expert witness appearances and more than half of the top 25).
They appear to play an almost orator-like role in the system. Two of these experts
are quantum/industry experts (Kaczmarek and Abdala); and three are international
law academics (but also arbitrators: Reisman, Dolzer, and Schreuer). Of these, three
have appeared for both claimants and respondents on a relatively regular basis.
50 Guglielmino and Abbona.
51 Pekar and Alvarez-Avila.
52 Crawford, Alexandrov, Paulsson, Gaillard, Gharavi, Volterra, Price, and Kalicki.
53 Abbona, Alvarez-Avila, Kalicki, Carlson, and Gill.
54 Pedroza.
55 Christopher Drahozal makes a similar observation in ‘Empirical Findings on International Arbitration: An
Overview’, in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds), Oxford Handbook on International Arbitration
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), forthcoming.
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Moving to the top 25, we see a pattern of almost exclusively Western expert wit-
nesses and only one woman (Slaughter). Given the number of female professors in
international economic law and public international law, this low usage of female
international law expert witnesses is quite striking. Although, it may not be surprising
given numerous psychological studies concerning gender cognitive bias in assessing
the reliability of witnesses.56 The same could be said of the absence of non-Western
international law professors. Indeed, the regular selection by legal counsel and law
firms of Western male expert witnesses implicitly suggests what international invest-
ment arbitrators view as credible. It also may also give credence to the hypothesis
(and indirect evidence) of a possible cognitive arbitral bias against less developed
states in international investment arbitration.57
Table 4. Expert witnesses—cases, nationality, and roles (top 25)
Rank Expert Nationality Role For
claimant
For
resp.
Total
cases
1 Brent Kaczmarek US Quantum/Industry Expert 17 11 28
2 Rudolf Dolzer Germany International Law Expert 13 4 17
3 W. Michael Reisman US International Law Expert 9 7 16
4 Christoph Schreuer Austria International Law Expert 11 2 13
5 Manuel Abdala US Quantum/Industry Expert 5 1 6
6 Anne-Marie Slaughter US International Law Expert 0 5 5
6 Ismael Mata Argentina National Law Expert 0 5 5
6 James Crawford Australia International Law Expert 1 4 5
6 James Dow US Quantum/Industry Expert 0 5 5
6 Joseph Kalt US Quantum/Industry Expert 4 1 5
6 Nico Schrijver Netherlands International Law Expert 2 3 5
6 Pablo Spiller US Quantum/Industry Expert 4 1 5
13 Alberto Bianchi Argentina Domestic Law Expert 4 0 4
13 Jan Paulsson France International Law Expert 3 1 4
13 Juan Andrade Ecuador National Law Expert 0 4 4
13 Lucian Mihai Romania National Law Expert 1 3 4
13 William Burke-White US International Law Expert 0 4 4
18 Adnan Amkhan UK International Law Expert 2 1 3
18 Benedict Kingsbury Australia International Law Expert 0 3 3
18 David Caron US International Law Expert 3 0 3
18 Hernan Pe´rez Loose Chile National Law Expert 3 0 3
18 Jose´ Alvarez US International Law Expert 3 0 3
18 Kenneth Vandevelde US International Law Expert 2 1 3
18 Robert Howse Canada International Law Expert 3 0 3
18 Thomas Waelde Germany International Law Expert 2 1 3
56 See e.g., Blake McKimmie et al., ‘Jurors Responses to Expert Witness Testimony: The Effects of Gender
Stereotypes’, 7(2) Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 131 (2004).
57 See Behn, Berge and Langford, above n 30.
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D. Tribunal secretaries
Finally, we include tribunal secretaries. While often invisible to the outside world,
the role of tribunal secretaries in shaping and influencing international litigation has
gained increased scholarly and political attention. While earlier studies indicated that
their role was largely confined to the non-substantive parts of award drafting,58 re-
cent accounts suggest that tribunal secretaries may be more influential.59
Table 5. Tribunal secretaries—cases, nationality, and institution (top 25)
Rank Secretary name Nationality Institution Total cases
1 Gonzalo Flores Chile ICSID 38
2 Martina Polasek Czech ICSID 30
3 Eloı¨se Obadia France ICSID 28
4 Aure´lia Antonietti France ICSID 25
5 Ucheora Onwuamaegbu Nigeria ICSID 24
6 Natalı Sequeira Costa Rica ICSID 21
7 Claudia Frutos-Peterson Mexico ICSID 20
8 Gabriela Alvarez-Avila Mexico ICSID 19
9 Mercedes Cordido-Freytes
de Kurowski
Venezuela ICSID 16
10 Aı¨ssatou Diop Senegal ICSID 15
10 Anneliese Fleckenstein Venezuela ICSID 15
12 Marco Mona~ne´s-Rumayor Mexico ICSID 13
12 Milanka Kostadinova Bulgaria ICSID 13
14 Paul-Jean Le Cannu France ICSID/PCA 12
15 Alicia Martın Blanco Spain ICSID 11
16 Frauke Nitschke Germany ICSID 10
16 Janet Whittaker UK ICSID 10
18 Tomas Solıs El Salvador ICSID 9
18 Alejandro Escobar Chile ICSID 9
18 Ann Catherine Kettlewell Mexico ICSID 9
21 Margrete Stevens Denmark ICSID 8
22 Martin Doe Canada PCA 7
22 Maire´e Uran-Bidegain Colombia ICSID 7
24 Geraldine Fischer US ICSID 6
24 Katia Yannaca-Small Greece ICSID 6
58 Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on Arbitration of
the New York City Bar Association, ‘Secretaries to International Arbitral Tribunals’, 17 American Review
of International Arbitration 575 (2006), at 585.
59 Taylor St. John, ‘Tribunal Secretaries’, PluriCourts Investment Arbitrator Behavior Workshop, Oslo, 25 May
2016. See also in relation to the WTO: Cossette Creamer, ‘Between the Letter of the Law and the
Demands of Politics: The Judicial Balancing of Trade Authority within the WTO’, Working Paper
(2015), available at: http://scholar.harvard.edu/cosettecreamer/publications/between-letter-law-and-de
mands-politics-balancing-authority-wto-dispute (visited 15 March 2017).
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Table 5 ranks the number of tribunal secretaries—in the 568 cases in which we
have information. Notably, the top 25 are responsible for administering 68% of these
cases. Interestingly, it is only at this point that we see any signs of gender or regional
diversity—a majority are women and slightly more than half come from non-
Western states.60
IV . WHO ARE THE POWER BROKERS?
The previous section mapped the different actors in the system. We now draw this
mapping analysis together to analyze the investment arbitration community as a
whole, and focus on the issue of power. As discussed in the introduction, we seek to
measure power in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Quantitatively, we count
the number of cases and connections as a measure of institutional power. Thus, indi-
viduals who are regularly engaged in international investment arbitration have the
opportunity to exercise significant material influence in the system. Moreover, high
numbers of appointments in any role usually increasing the chances of future ap-
pointment—a sign of symbolic power.61
Qualitatively, we are concerned with shading the degree of material and symbolic
power that comes with a particular position in arbitration. Thus we further expand
our relationship matrix to facilitate the perceived variances of influence between the
different roles and the parties they represent. This weighting attempts to normalize
and avoid overemphasis of lesser roles in the system. Therefore, we rank arbitrators
higher than counsel and counsel higher than tribunal secretaries and witnesses. In
addition, we assign further weights for distance between actors, according to the
structure of arbitration.
These weightings are of course somewhat arbitrary but we describe and justify
them as follows. First, as discussed above, presiding arbitrators are given a weighting
of 1 and wing arbitrators (0.75). Second, we weight counsel at (0.5) but introduce
also a distance weighting. We weight the relationship between a claimant counsel and
claimant-appointed wing arbitrator at (1.25); yet for the same claimant counsel and
the respondent arbitrator we weight the relationship at (0.75). The former is done
because the relationship is close (and one is involved in nominating the other), while
the latter is done because the two actors are much further apart. The same logic is
applied in reverse to a respondent counsel. Third, we weight tribunal secretaries at
(0.375) and witnesses at (0.25). We also apply distance weightings to the expert wit-
nesses. Thus, the relationship between a claimant witness and claimant counsel is
weighted at (1.25), but (0.75) for a claimant witness and respondent counsel.
Based on this methodology, we can identify the power brokers in the system. In
Table 6, we provide a new and alternative picture of the most powerful actors. For
certain actors, there is a clear jump up the ladder. Arbitrators that have worn multiple
hats or individuals with other hats constitute this surging group. They have served as
60 It may be that there is a selection bias. Most of the publicly available information about tribunal secreta-
ries comes from ICSID cases, which are hosted by the World Bank. This institution has a partial commit-
ment to regional diversity as an intergovernmental organization. However, we note that women appeared
to be well-represented in many arbitration centers along with increasingly a greater number of non-
Western nationals. But this is a subject for further investigation.
61 See extended discussion in St. John et al., above n 12.
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both legal counsel and arbitrator (e.g., Alexandrov, Crawford, Price, Paulsson,
Gilliard, and Schwebel); both expert witness and arbitrator (e.g., Reisman); or fre-
quently as tribunal secretaries (e.g., Alvarez-Avila and Flores).
The existence of a differently configured group of arbitrators allows us also to re-
visit existing explanatory theories on arbitrator selection. Importantly, our findings
highlight the often implicit but under-emphasized role of counsel and others in those
explanations. As noted earlier, Ginsburg’s theory emphasized strategic action and the
use of barriers to keep out new entrants. However, it was Roger who noted the role
of information asymmetries as a key strategic entry barrier. Information asymmetries
are typical of ad hoc systems and benefit all insiders, and she noted the role of coun-
sel and tribunal secretaries.62 Indeed, one arbitration lawyer recently boasted that
their competitive advantage lies in what is ‘not written down’.63 Thus, the existence
of a core group of counsel, which includes a significant number that also act as arbi-
tratators, may enhance the maintenance of those information asymmetries.
Table 6. All actors—network rankings (top 25)
Rank Name Nationality Arb. Counsel Exp. Sec. HITS
hub
Page
rank
Degrees out
(weighted)
1 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler Switzerland 56 0 0 0 1.00000 0.00373 753 (641)
2 L. Yves Fortier Canada 53 0 0 0 0.87664 0.00423 761 (655)
3 Brigitte Stern France 88 0 0 0 0.87278 0.00622 1067 (727)
4 V.V. Veeder UK 37 2 0 0 0.55004 0.00298 493 (419)
5 Francisco Orrego Vicu~na Chile 49 0 0 0 0.54280 0.00322 542 (428)
6 Stanimir Alexandrov Bulgaria 32 31 0 0 0.52113 0.00411 781 (424)
7 Charles Brower US 52 0 0 0 0.48111 0.00314 582 (386)
8 James Crawford Australia 27 14 5 0 0.48067 0.00394 697 (408)
9 Daniel Price US 18 13 0 0 0.48031 0.00190 470 (260)
10 Emmanuel Gaillard France 23 21 0 0 0.47015 0.00344 676 (370)
11 Bernard Hanotiau Belgium 40 3 0 0 0.44905 0.00304 497 (394)
12 Jan Paulsson France 28 18 4 0 0.4454 0.00378 662 (363)
13 Albert Jan van den Berg Netherlands 44 0 0 0 0.44069 0.00324 533 (405)
14 J. Christopher Thomas Canada 43 3 0 0 0.42114 0.00299 520 (340)
15 Karl-Heinz Bo¨ckstiegel Germany 40 0 0 0 0.41590 0.00273 400 (359)
16 Marc Lalonde Canada 35 0 0 0 0.39232 0.00258 452 (330)
17 Stephen Schwebel US 18 9 0 0 0.38389 0.00202 396 (232)
18 Bernardo Cremades Spain 37 2 0 0 0.37650 0.00249 400 (303)
19 Piero Bernardini Italy 36 1 0 0 0.37495 0.00234 357 (304)
20 Gonzalo Flores Chile 0 0 0 38 0.34236 0.00334 662 (251)
21 W. Michael Reisman US 19 1 16 0 0.33781 0.00298 607 (253)
22 Juan Fernandez-Armesto Spain 29 0 0 0 0.32955 0.00220 325 (308)
23 Franklin Berman UK 24 0 0 0 0.32912 0.00164 290 (250)
24 Vaughan Lowe UK 24 1 1 0 0.32573 0.00206 339 (271)
25 Gabriela Alvarez-Avila Mexico 0 18 0 19 0.32565 0.00330 610 (252)
62 Catherine Rogers, ‘The Vocation of the International Arbitrator’, 20 American University International
Law Review 957 (2004), at 968–9.
63 GAR, Global Arbitration Review 100: The Guide to Specialist Arbitration Firms 2012 (Geneva: GAR, 2012),
at 3, cited in Eberhardt and Olivet, above n 24.
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Moreover, Rogers highlighted two structural factors that shape the imperfect
competitive nature of the arbitration market. These are the (i) role of insiders in
making arbitration appointments64 and (ii) lack of regulation (with an absence of
legal/judicial oversight and little room for reputational sanction).65 The existence
of a strong core group beyond pure arbitrators accentuates potentially both as-
pects. First, legal counsel and tribunal secretaries are pivotal in making or influenc-
ing appointments. They are the clear power brokers in the first phase of an
arbitration. Indeed, we might speculate that a revolving door increases incentives
for a special form of oligopolistic behavior: making appointments in expectation of
a return favor. In future research, we will test the likelihood that counsel nominate
arbitrators that may be more likely to appoint them when these arbitrators act as
counsel: a reciprocal revolving door. Second, the closeness and ties in the commu-
nity may not incentivize public reputational sanctions. The power that insider legal
counsel hold in appointments may strongly disincentivize critique. In other words,
those who are too critical can be quickly subject to exclusion or relegation to a
wing arbitrator role.
Thus, by foregrounding the role of the broader arbitration community we can en-
rich existing theories about the arbitration market. It especially allows us to identify
the deeply embedded power brokers who may determine the ability of outsiders to
enter and insiders to remain.
V. DOUBLE HATTING
We now turn to the question of whether there is double hatting—the simultaneous
fulfillment of two roles, especially arbitrator and counsel. The issue of whether it is
acceptable for an individual to sit simultaneously as an arbitrator in one case and
act as legal counsel in another case has been the subject of a long-running and
heated debate within the international commercial arbitration community;66 and it
moved to center stage with the rise of treaty-based arbitration in the 2000s. Critics
of the international investment arbitration regime have continually pointed to the
legitimacy concerns that arise when a system of adjudication permits adjudicators
to act as arbitrator in one case and as legal counsel in another. One of the interest-
ing points about the legitimacy of this double hatting issue in international invest-
ment arbitration is that it is not only subject to criticism from the outside, but is a
practice where insiders in the community have remained actively split over the past
decade.
Leading the charge against the practice of double hatting from the inside is Sands,
who over the past decade has repeatedly written and lectured about the legitimacy
concerns tied to double hatting in international arbitration.67 For Sands, the conflict
issues that can arise are relatively clear:
64 ‘Arbitrator selection is often in the hands of members of the same “club,” who are either operating in the
institutions or already appointed as party-appointed arbitrators.’ Rogers, above n 23, at 12.
65 Ibid, at 970–75.
66 For a summary of the discourse on this issue, see Sebastian Perry, ‘Arbitrator and Counsel: the Double-
Hat Syndrome’, Global Arbitration Review (15 March 2012).
67 See e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Arbitrator Decries “Revolving Door” Roles of Lawyers in Investment Treaty
Arbitration’, Investment Arbitration Reporter (25 February 2010).
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it is possible to recognise the difficulty that may arise if a lawyer spends a
morning drafting an arbitral award that addresses a contentious legal issue, and
then in the afternoon as counsel in a different case drafts a pleading making ar-
guments on the same legal issue. Can that lawyer, while acting as arbitrator,
cut herself off entirely from her simultaneous role as counsel? The issue is not
whether she thinks it can be done, but whether a reasonable observer would so
conclude. Speaking for myself, I find it difficult to imagine that I could do so
without, in some way, potentially being seen to run the risk of allowing myself
to be influenced, however subconsciously.68
While acknowledging that many of his colleagues believe that they can effectively
separate the different roles that they may play in different arbitrations, Sands articu-
lates that this practice nonetheless is not good for international arbitration. It can
never fully shield itself against questions of perceived bias. In terms of legitimacy for
the system, it is a practice that should be avoided.69 Likewise, Judge Thomas
Buergenthal of the International Court of Justice, in a 2006 lecture, summarized the
issues that can arise when arbitrators act simultaneously or sequentially as counsel:
I have long believed that the practice of allowing arbitrators to serve as counsel,
and counsel to serve as arbitrators, raises due process of law issues. In my view, ar-
bitrators and counsel should be required to decide to be one or the other, and be
held to the choice they have made, at least for a specific period of time. That is ne-
cessary, in my opinion, in order to ensure that an arbitrator will not be tempted,
consciously or unconsciously, to seek to obtain a result in an arbitral decision that
might advance the interests of a client in a case he or she is handling as counsel.
ICSID is particularly vulnerable to this problem because the interpretation and ap-
plication of the same or similar legal instruments—the Bilateral Investment
Treaties, for example—are regularly at issue in different cases before it [. . .].
These revolving-door problems—counsel selecting an arbitrator who, the next
time around when the arbitrator is counsel, selects the previous counsel as arbitra-
tor—should be avoided. Manus manum lavat, in other words—you scratch my
back and I‘ll scratch yours, does not advance the rule of law.70
While Sands, Buergenthal and others have highlighted why the practice of double
hatting is ethically undesirable for arbitrators and legal counsel to practice, it is not un-
common to hear arguments that support the practice, and these arguments draw princi-
pally upon structural and economic claims. Firstly, they hold that there is a relatively
small pool of arbitrators that can sit in these types of arbitrations and that limiting
68 Sands, above n 20, at 31–32.
69 Some arbitrators have clarified their role in similar terms although on a more individual basis: ‘I don’t feel
the need to stand on the rooftops and preach about my own practice. I have not appeared as counsel in
investor-state arbitration or indeed inter-state arbitration . . .. I find it more comfortable to confine my ar-
bitration role to being an arbitrator or member of an ICSID annulment committee.’ See Interview with
Sir Frank Berman in Sebastian Perry, ‘To Be Frank’, Global Arbitration Review (21 February 2013).
70 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect for the
Rule of Law’, 3(5) Transnational Dispute Management (2006).
322  Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article-abstract/20/2/301/3859188 by U
niversity of Liverpool user on 15 February 2019
qualified individuals from sitting as arbitrator due to work as legal counsel would under-
mine the quality and rigor of the adjudicators acting in the current system.71 Secondly,
they claim that that there is an economic argument for not limiting the practice of dou-
ble hatting: many legal counsel seeking to become full time arbitrators cannot justify giv-
ing up their counsel practice when there is no guarantee that arbitral appointments will
come in the future.72 Therefore, under this scenario, it is inevitable that some double
hatting will occur during the transitionary period between the time an individual acts pri-
marily as counsel to the time that they become a full-time arbitrator.
Empirically speaking, the first of these arguments would only hold for the 1990s.
Since then, the potential pool of investment arbitrators has expanded significantly. And
while there may be a shortage of qualified arbitrators in other fields such as interna-
tional commercial arbitration,73 investment arbitration appointments are viewed as
highly prestigious.74 Investment arbitration is a buyer’s market not a seller’s market. It
is also not clear how far the second argument extends temporally. Once counsel has
obtained their first or even second arbitrator appointment, they could desist from ac-
cepting future counsel appointments as they ease into a new role.
Ethically speaking, however, both of these justifications for the practice are rather
unpersuasive, given that, at a minimum, the practice of double hatting can reasonably
give raise to questions of potential or perceived bias or conflict. And these appear-
ances of bias or conflict that can arise in this context are not merely hypothetical.
There are a number of examples where the double hatting problem has become the
subject of formal challenges.
This classic example involves French arbitrator Gaillard and an international in-
vestment arbitration case (Telkom Malaysia v Ghana75), where he was acting as the
claimant-appointed arbitrator at the same time that he was also acting as claimant’s
counsel in an ICSID annulment proceeding in a different case (RFCC v Morocco76).
Even though Gaillard disclosed that he was acting as counsel in the ICSID annul-
ment case, the respondent state (Ghana) in the arbitration where he was acting as ar-
bitrator lodged multiple challenges against him in the Hague District Court77
(Netherlands was the seat of the arbitration) alleging that his role as arbitrator was
incompatible with his simultaneous role as counsel in the ICSID annulment case, es-
pecially due to the fact that both cases involved similar legal issues and that Ghana
71 On this point, Barton Legum, a prominent counsel and arbitrator based in Paris, has noted that: ‘the pool
of qualified arbitrators is already “vanishingly small” and that it would be problematic for the users of the
arbitration system if efforts were made to exclude all practicing BIT counsel from this pool.’ Peterson,
above n 65.
72 ‘I have a lot of sympathy for those who say you need arbitrators with skill and experience. How on earth
does somebody get established as an arbitrator if he or she never gets a chance to start? So I think inevit-
ably there has to be some overlap. But there may be a stage in one’s career when it becomes sensible to
do one thing or the other.’ Ibid, at 2.
73 Ibid, at 2.
74 Franck, above n 9.
75 Telekom Malaysia Berhad v The Republic of Ghana, PCA Case No. 2003-03, UNCITRAL, Settled.
76 Consortium R.F.C.C. v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on Annulment
(18 January 2006).
77 Republic of Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Hague District Court, Challenge No. 13/2004, Petition
No. HA/RK 2004.667, 18 October 2004; Challenge 17/2004, Petition No. HA/RK/2004/778,
5 November 2004.
Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration  323
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article-abstract/20/2/301/3859188 by U
niversity of Liverpool user on 15 February 2019
was relying on the case of RFCC v Morocco in its submissions. Ghana argued inter
alia, that Gaillard, ‘who in his capacity of counsel opposes a specific notion or ap-
proach, cannot be unbiased in his judgment of that same notion or approach in a
case in which he acts as arbitrator’.78 The Hague District Court ordered Gaillard to
choose whether to continue as arbitrator or counsel, but not both. Gaillard subse-
quently resigned from this position as counsel in the ICSID annulment proceedings.
Even if Gaillard was able to separate his different roles in different cases, this ex-
ample highlights, at a minimum, that an appearance of bias or conflict was reasonable,
even if there was no showing of actual bias. Ultimately, this challenge to Gaillard was
resolved through his resignation in one of his roles; however, it is important to note
that neither the various arbitration rules (i.e., ICSID, SCC,79 ICC,80 and UNCITRAL)
nor the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration explicitly pro-
hibit this practice.81 While the IBA Guidelines do not provide bright line rules prevent-
ing arbitrators to act simultaneously as counsel, the IBA Guidelines are clear on the
arbitrator’s role in cases where justifiable doubts arise in regard to the arbitrator’s inde-
pendence or impartiality. The IBA Guidelines on issues of conflict of interest states:
(a) An arbitrator shall decline to accept an appointment or, if the arbitration
has already been commenced, refuse to continue to act as an arbitrator, if he
or she has any doubt as to his or her ability to be impartial or independent;
(b) The same principle applies if facts or circumstances exist, or have arisen
since the appointment, which, from the point of view of a reasonable third per-
son having knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances, would give rise
to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence [. . .];
(c) Doubts are justifiable if a reasonable third person, having knowledge of the
relevant facts and circumstances, would reach the conclusion that there is a
likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the mer-
its of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or her decision.82
In cases where an arbitrator is acting simultaneously in another case as counsel, there
are situations—as highlighted in the above example—where an appearance of bias
or conflict arises to the degree where a reasonable third person would have justifiable
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. Yet, the IBA Guidelines
are just that: guidelines. They do not create clear legal obligations on arbitrators that
can be sanctioned. As a result, the international arbitration community must rely to a
degree on ‘self-regulation’ or ‘self-policing’ if the practice of double hatting is to be
minimized in the short-term.
Nonetheless, our concern is not to resolve this debate but rather assess empiric-
ally the extent to which double hatting actually occurs in international investment ar-
bitration; and to propose some ways in which the practice could be minimized. In
78 Ibid, Challenge No. 13/2004, Petition No. HA/RK 2004.667, p. 3.
79 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
80 International Chamber of Commerce.
81 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Adopted by resolution of the IBA
Council on Thursday 23 October 2014.
82 Ibid, Part I, Article 2.
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determining the existence of double hatting, we have developed a customized algo-
rithm. Through a multi-factor calculation, we determine an all-time score for each in-
dividual and an annual score.
The double hatting index is calculated as follows. If a person in a given year is
involved only as either arbitrator or legal counsel, i.e. is wearing only ‘one hat’, the in-
dividual is not assigned any points. If, however, she or he is involved with a minimum
of two investment arbitration cases in a minimum of two different roles, then a
‘yearly score’ of (2) is assigned to that individual for a given year. The score does not
attempt to describe the intensity of double hatting within a calendar year, and hence
the maximum score an individual can receive for a year is (2). Cases are included in
the evaluation from their constitution date and until they are either discontinued, set-
tled or finally resolved through a decision in the form of an award. Cases that are
pending as of 1 January 2017 have a concluding date as of 1 January 2017 for the
purposes of our analysis. Our double hatting index is a somewhat conservative meas-
ure. It does not take into account potentially multiple conflicts of interests (due to
appointments in many cases).
Figure 5 lists the top 25 according to those criteria (the full list is set out in
Annex I). The top four places go to actors that we have already identified as power
brokers in the international investment arbitration community. These are Gaillard,
Paulsson, Crawford, and Hobe´r. This group all has scores over 30, which means con-
siderable double hatting over a long period of time. However, there is a considerable
group hot on their heels with 20 arbitrators with scores over 20. Some of these are
prominent arbitrators but many also represent a new generation of actors that may
be transitioning to full time arbitrator roles (i.e., Silva Romero, Bishop, Heiskanen,
and Douglas). It is also interesting to note that those arbitrators which have made
Figure 5. The double hatting index (top 25).
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clear statements on the problem of double hatting (e.g., Sands and Reisman) have
very low double hatting scores despite being central figures in the network. (see
Annex I)
However, it is not uncommon for the international investment arbitration com-
munity to claim that the problem of double hatting has been decreasing over time.
Our index above is ahistorical and measures cross-sectionally double hatting. Thus,
in Figure 6, we have calculated the double hatting index over time for the top 25 ar-
bitrators and for all arbitrators.
The yearly results in Figure 6 suggest that there has not been a significant de-
crease (or increase) over time. Instead, the phenomenon for the top 25 double hat-
ters appears to have been relatively stable since 2005—hovering between scores of
35 and 50 with only a slight decline over the past decade. It is much less stable for
other individuals with a large rise up to 2014 and then a strong fall. Thus, it seems
too early to conclude that there has been a dramatic change in the practice. There
appears to be a select group of arbitrators that frequently double hat as legal counsel.
In order to make this continuous practice of the top 25 double hatters clear on an
individual basis, we have tracked each year of their double hatting (Table 7). What is
particularly notable is that those who have ceased double hatting in the last three to
four years have largely ceased taking cases new cases as either arbitrator or counsel
as they reach retirement age (i.e., Cremades, Schwebel, El-Kosheri, and Hertzfeld).
However, in some other cases, the lack of double hatting in the past few years is
probably more likely the result of: having a sufficiently large caseload as arbitrator as
to preclude the time or economic necessity to act as counsel simultaneously
(i.e., Hanotiau), or being appointed as judge to the International Court of Justice
(i.e., Greenwood and Crawford), which restricts counsel work during the time that
the individual is on the bench. Therefore, it does not appear that the individuals ceas-
ing to double hat over the past few years are making this choice as a response to the
ethical or conflict issues that have arisen in the discourse critiquing the practice.
Figure 6. Double hatting over time.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article was to present a preliminary assessment of the complete
network of actors in the international investment arbitration community to date.
Instead of focusing on one group or type of actors within the regime, we have sought
to provide a comprehensive map of all relevant actors and their roles in order to
identify those actors which move between different roles and even wear multiple
hats simultaneously (double hatting).
What we find is that the 1000-plus international investment arbitration cases to
date have involved almost 4000 known individuals and that within this select group
of individuals there is a prominent core that is both highly influential and powerful
within the system. Our social network analysis suggests a deep set of ‘power brokers’
across the field, as those passing regularly through the revolving door score quite
highly on our measures of power. This suggests that an analysis of power cannot be
constrained to the arbitral role. As we have highlighted, the key explanatory theories
of the uncompetitive nature of the arbitration markets implicitly or explicitly take
into account this structural feature.
In terms of double hatting, we find that the practice continues to exist. In reality,
it is a very small group but it is constituted by highly influential and well-known indi-
viduals. In other words, double hatting is not a common or widespread practice
across the entire network of cases (i.e., breadth), it is practiced so consistently by a
highly visible and powerful core of some of the most influential actors in the system
(i.e., depth). Given that critiques of double hatting focus on the perceived bias and
lack of impartiality, independence and legitimacy that such a practice can have on
the reasonable outside observer, its prevalence amongst influential actors is question-
able even if there is a debate on its actual effects on independence.
Turning to reform, if about 10 to 15 individuals agreed to stop double hatting, it
is highly probable that the major critiques against its practice would evaporate. While
it would be preferable for the legitimacy of the system for top double hatters to self-
regulate in this manner, there are potential rule changes that could mandate the ter-
mination of this practice. One way would be to include a double hatting ban in new
IIAs that have been signed (as for e.g. in the recent CETA83) or through a reform or
modification of the institutional rules governing the vast majority of these
arbitrations.84
83 Article 8.30(1) of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement stipulates that members
of the Tribunal: ‘. . . shall be independent . . . In addition, upon appointment, they shall refrain from act-
ing as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any pending or new investment dispute under
this or any other international agreement.’
84 For a detailed assessment of the rules governing international investment arbitration and their relation to
double hatting, see Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Lise Johnson and Fiona Marshall, Arbitrator
Independence and Impartiality: Examining the Dual Role of Arbitrator and Counsel (Winnipeg: IISD, 2010).
328  Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jiel/article-abstract/20/2/301/3859188 by U
niversity of Liverpool user on 15 February 2019
Annex I. Complete list of double hatters
Name Double
hat score
Arbitrator
appointments
Counsel
appointments
Emmanuel Gaillard 40 23 21
Jan Paulsson 38 28 18
James Crawford 34 27 14
Kaj Hobe´r 34 19 11
Daniel Price 32 18 13
Bernardo Cremades 30 37 2
Florentino Feliciano 28 12 4
William Park 28 21 1
Guido Santiago Tawil 28 14 6
Robert Volterra 28 5 16
Stanimir Alexandrov 24 32 31
Eric Schwartz 24 4 4
Christoph Schreuer 24 15 1
Stephen Schwebel 24 18 9
Eduardo Silva Romero 22 10 12
Jeffrey Hertzfeld 22 4 3
Toby Landau 22 24 11
Zachary Douglas 22 19 13
Ahmed El-Kosheri 22 15 3
R. Doak Bishop 22 12 16
Veijo Heiskanen 20 13 6
Bernard Hanotiau 20 40 3
Giorgio Sacerdoti 20 5 2
Fernando Mantilla-Serrano 20 6 7
Christopher Greenwood 20 16 5
J. Christopher Thomas 18 43 3
Hamid Gharavi 18 6 18
Yas Banifatemi 18 6 10
Gaetan Verhoosel 18 1 7
Jean Kalicki 18 10 16
Barton Legum 18 5 11
Hugo Perezcano-Diaz 18 4 11
Pierre Mayer 18 12 7
Mark Clodfelter 18 5 15
Noah Rubins 18 3 12
Andre´s Jana 18 3 4
Gabriel Bottini 18 5 11
Phillipe Sands 16 30 6
Marney Cheek 16 1 2
Carolyn Lamm 16 2 10
(Continued)
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Annex I. (continued)
Name Double
hat score
Arbitrator
appointments
Counsel
appointments
Raul Vinuesa 16 17 3
Donald Donovan 16 5 3
Antonio Crivellaro 16 3 7
Samuel Wordsworth 14 3 5
Karim Hafez 14 1 2
V.V. Veeder 14 37 2
Gary Born 12 18 2
Arthur Watts 12 4 1
Salim Moollan 12 2 2
Lucinda Low 12 1 1
Sabine Konrad 12 2 7
Luca Radicati di Brozolo 12 1 9
Ibrahim Fadlallah 12 11 2
Elihu Lauterpacht 12 10 2
Dominique Schmidt 10 1 1
Donald McRae 10 22 1
Anna Joubin-Bret 10 7 1
Christer So¨derlund 10 8 1
Pedro Martınez-Fraga 10 1 1
Osvaldo Ce´sar Guglielmino 10 1 25
C. Mark Baker 10 2 4
Charles Jarrosson 10 1 4
Stephen Jagusch 10 3 18
Andrew Newcombe 8 2 1
Raed Fathallah 8 3 3
Thomas Clay 8 3 1
John Savage 8 1 9
Oscar Garibaldi 8 3 5
Maurice Mendelson 8 1 1
Arif Ali 8 1 10
Mohammed Chemloul 8 2 2
Gavan Griffith 8 20 1
Jesus Pe~nalver 8 2 1
Vaughan Lowe 8 24 1
John Townsend 8 9 5
Audley Sheppard 8 1 9
Andreas Lowenfeld 6 5 1
Matthias Scherer 6 1 5
Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez 6 6 5
Alberto Wray Espinosa 6 1 9
(Continued)
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Annex I. (continued)
Name Double
hat score
Arbitrator
appointments
Counsel
appointments
Cecil Abraham 6 11 2
Joe Smouha 6 1 3
Melanie Van Leeuwen 6 1 1
Klaus Reichart 6 5 3
Teresa Cheng 6 8 1
Todd Weiler 6 1 20
Philippe Pinsolle 6 2 1
Alejandro Escobar 4 1 9
Arthur Marriott 4 1 6
Rudolf Dolzer 4 4 2
Lucy Reed 4 3 10
David Pawlak 4 1 11
David Haigh 4 7 3
Jose´ Marıa Alonso 4 1 1
James Carter 4 2 1
Kamal Hossain 4 12 1
Cherie Booth 4 1 2
Don Wallace 2 2 3
Makhdoom Ali Khan 2 8 3
Eric Teynier 2 1 2
Richard Happ 2 1 6
Aktham El-Kohly 2 1 2
John Beechey 2 17 1
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